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Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Informatics, Technical University of Košice
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Abstract. If the control system besides the standard control functions also realizes
the functions (known as safety functions), failures of which can influence safety of
the controlled process, then the control system may be a source of risk for assets,
that are within the scope of the controlled process. Early detection of these failures
and subsequent negation of their effects can have a significant influence on the
safety integrity level of the safety function and thus also on the elimination of
risks related to the controlled process. Therefore, the diagnostics is the means
which, if appropriately applied, can increase not only the availability, but also the
safety of the control system. The paper deals with using the homogeneous Markov
chains to influence the evaluation of on-line diagnostics on the hardware safety
integrity of the safety function, depending on the application method of several
simultaneously operating diagnostics mechanisms and their basic parameters – the
failures diagnostic coverage coefficient and the failure diagnostics time.
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1 INTRODUCTION
There are many cases in industry, when the controlled process can be a source of
a significant danger that can result in personal injury, environmental damage or other
undesirable consequences. If the risk related to the controlled process is bigger than
the acceptable risk, then it is necessary to use appropriate measures to minimize
this risk at least to the acceptable risk level [1, 2]. One of the technical measures
is also the use of safety functions (SF), that are implemented by the safety related
control system (SRCS). SF is function (risk reduction measure), that is intended to
achieve or maintain a safe state for the equipment under control (EUC), in respect
of a specific hazardous event [1].
From a safety point of view it is important to detect and negate any dangerous
failure as soon as possible (negation – enforcement of a safe state following the de-
tection of a failure). As the dangerous failure (in this paper) is considered the failure
that causes the SRCS transition into a dangerous state or increases the probability
of the SRCS transition into a dangerous state. The failure detection and subse-
quent negation of the failure consequences have significant influence on the safety
integrity level (SIL) of the SF [1, 12, 13]. Therefore, the SRCS generally contains
on-line functional diagnostics in addition to on-line test diagnostics (the SRCS is
automatically on-line tested), especially if SFs are implemented with the SIL3 or
SIL4 [4, 15].
To analyze the failures consequences on the hardware safety integrity, the meth-
ods that were originally intended for the analysis of the reliability – RBD (Reliability
Block Diagram) and FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) are very often used. However, these
methods do not allow a complex influence assessment of multiple properties of the
SRCS on the hardware safety integrity of the SFs, which are realized by the SRCS.
From this point of view, it is more appropriate to use for example the methods using
the continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC), either alone [3, 14], or in a combination
with the discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) [6]. Also it is possible to use other
methods, for example methods based on the Petri nets [7, 8, 9].
The publications, dealing with the failures on-line diagnostics influence on the
hardware safety integrity, generally consider only one failure detection mechanism
that operates continuously in time [5, 9, 15]. The failure detection mechanism,
which operates discreetly in time, is considered only in case of periodic maintenance
or repair of the system [4, 9, 10, 11, 16]. However, in practice it is possible that
the SRCS contains more mechanisms for the failures detection, which vary by their
parameters and the character of the activity. This paper deals with the analysis
of the simultaneous operation of several mechanisms of the failures detection and
their influence on the hardware safety integrity of the SF. The usage of the proposed
method is presented on the SRCS with dual structure based on composite fail-safety
with fail-safe comparison.
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2 MARKOV CHAINS
Let us consider a stochastic process that fulfills the Markov property
Pr {X (t) ≤ x | X (t0) = x0, X (t1) = x1, . . . , X (tn) = xn}
= Pr {X (t) ≤ x | X (tn) = xn}
where X(t) is the random variable, t ∈ T (T is the time range) is the time parameter
and is valid, that 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < · · · < tn < t.
If the value, which is acquired by X(t), is called state and if the set of states is
countable, then Markov process forms the Markov chain (MC). We distinguish two
basic types of the MC:
• discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC);
• continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC).
The MC can be homogeneous or nonhomogeneous. In this paper a premise is
accepted that the considered MC are homogeneous.
For the homogeneous DTMC the transition probability of the system from state
i to state j can be calculated as the conditional probability, that the system in time
t = n+ 1 goes to state j, under the condition, that the system in time t = n was in
state i, i.e.
pij = Pr{Xn+1 = j | Xn = i}. (1)
The homogeneous DTMC is completely defined, if the transition matrix (2) and the
initial distribution (3) are defined.




P0(t = 0) = {p1(t = 0), p2(t = 0), . . . , pm(t = 0)} (3)
where
−→
P0 is the initial distribution at time t = 0, pi(t = 0) is the probability of state




Pk · P. (4)
For the homogeneous CTMC the transition probability of the system from state i
to j state can be calculated as the conditional probability, that the system in time
t = t + ∆t goes to state j, under the condition, that the system in time t was in
state i, i.e.
Pij(t+ ∆t) = Pr{X(t+ ∆t) = j | X(t) = i}. (5)
The homogeneous CTMC is completely defined, if the transition rate matrix (6) and
the initial distribution (3) are defined.
Q = (qij) for i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (6)
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where qij is the transition rate from state i to state j and qii = −
∑m
j=1,j 6=1 qij is
the sojourn rate in state i. If the CTMC is homogeneous, the transition rates are
constant.
The CTMC distribution in time t can be calculated as a solution of the differ-






P (t) ·Q. (7)
3 GENERAL VIEW ON THE FAILURES DIAGNOSTICS
The SRCS can contain one or more failure detection mechanisms. The failure de-
tection mechanism can be characterized by the failure detection time td and the
diagnostic coverage coefficient c. For the hardware safety integrity evaluation the





where λdD is the dangerous detectable hardware failure rate and c is the diagnostic
coverage coefficient and λD is the dangerous failure rate.
In general, it is valid, that λD = k · λ, k ≤ 1. If the value k cannot be exactly
proved for the application, it is necessary to choose the value k in accordance with
the requirements of the relevant standards for the applications area.
If the SRCS contains one failure detection mechanism, this mechanism in prin-
ciple can work by a schedule where the failure diagnostics operates:
• periodically and discreetly in time – always at the end of the diagnostic cycle
(Figure 1 a)), while tcd  ttd; tcd is the diagnostic cycle time (it can be identified
with the maximum time of the failure detection) and ttd is the operation time
of the failure detection mechanism (the testing time); or
• periodically and continuously in time (Figure 1 b)).
If the SRCS contains two failure detection mechanisms, it is necessary to assume,
that these mechanisms differ from each other by the failure detection time and the
diagnostic coverage of the failures.
Let the system contains two failure detection mechanisms:
• the “rapid”detection mechanism (RM), which is characterized by the detection
time tRd and the diagnostic coverage coefficient of the dangerous failures cDR;
• the “slow”detection mechanism (SM), which is characterized by the detection
time tSd and the diagnostic coverage coefficient of the dangerous failures cDS.
The Figure 2 shows the influence of these two diagnostics mechanisms on the
overall diagnostic coverage of the dangerous failures. It shows, that
λD = λuD + λdD R + λdD X (9)
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where λD is the dangerous failure rate, λuD is the undetectable dangerous failure
rate, λdD R is the dangerous failure rate, which are detectable by the RM, λdD X is
the dangerous failure rate, which are detectable only by the SM.
a) Periodically and discreetly in time b) Periodically and continuously in time
Figure 1. Operation of the failure detection mechanism
Figure 2. Diagnostic coverage of failures – two failure detection mechanisms
The probability of the failure detection by the SM, which was not detected by
the RM, can be calculated according to the equation
Px =
cD − cDR





where cD is the diagnostic coverage coefficient of the dangerous failures, which are
detectable by the RM or SM and cDR is the diagnostic coverage coefficient of the
dangerous failures, which are detectable by the RM.
In reality it is necessary to assume, that some of the dangerous failures are
covered by both failure detection mechanisms and also that there can be a part
of failures, which are not covered by any failure detection mechanism. In gen-
eral, the diagnostic coverage of the failures covered by the SM can be significantly
lower than the diagnostic coverage of the failures covered by the RM, because the
SM may be intended for detection of certain failures, which are not detectable by
the RM.
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Generally, it is possible to say, that:
• cD > cDR; if cD = cDR, it does not make any sense to apply the SM and PX = 0;
• if cDR < 1 and at the same time cD = 1, then PX = 1.
If the SRCS contains more failure detection mechanisms, a simplified method
can be also used as the parameters estimation of the failure diagnostics, based on
pessimistic premise that
cD = max {cDi} for i =∈ {1, . . . , n},
tcd = max {tcdi} for i =∈ {1, . . . , n} (11)
where cDi is the diagnostic coverage coefficient of dangerous failures, which are
detectable by ith failure detection mechanism; tcdi is the maximum time of the
dangerous failure detection, which is detectable by ith failure detection mechanism
and n is a number of failure detection mechanisms.
4 THE HARDWARE SAFETY INTEGRITY
OF THE DUAL STRUCTURE
In practice, SRCS with dual structure based on composite fail-safety are often used
with fail-safe comparison. The standard [1] requires to realize the hardware safety
integrity evaluation not for the system, but individually for each SF. Due to clarity
reason of this paper it is assumed that the SRCS comprises two hardware identi-
cal and physically independent units – unit R and unit L (Figure 3), which con-
trol the EUC. Let both these units participate in realization of one SF and each
unit may contain several elements – for example sensors, logic, actuators. On this
premise, the dangerous state of the SRCS can be identified with dangerous failure
of the SF.
Figure 3. Block diagram of a general dual structure
In general, the SRCS with this structure has the RM, which is based on mu-
tual data comparison of the units R and L after each operation cycle (comparative
mechanism) and in many cases also the SM, which is focused on the failures, which
are not detectable by the comparative mechanism.
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As it is the dual structure with identical units, it is valid:
λL = λR = λ (12)
where λL is the hardware failure rate of the unit L and λR is the hardware failure
rate of the unit R.
5 THE DANGEROUS FAILURE PROBABILITY OF THE SF
In general, the SF can be performed in the low demand mode of operation or in the
high demand mode of operation (in continuous mode of operation) [1].
If the SF operates in the continuous mode, then as the dangerous state of the
SRCS is considered the state, which terminates the ability to realize its SF in com-
pliance with the safety requirements specifications. In this case, the analysis of the
SRCS failure consequences ends when the dangerous state is reached – it is necessary
to identify the dangerous state of the SRCS with the dangerous state of the EUC.
In this paper it is considered, that the SF operates in the continuous mode
and occurrence of the electronic elements failures can be regarded as the continuous
random process, which follows the exponential distribution law. It is also taken into
account the pessimistic assumption, that
λD = λ, cD = c, cDR = cR, cDS = cS (13)
where c is the overall diagnostic coverage coefficient of the failures, cR(cS) is the
diagnostic coverage coefficient of the failures covered by the RM (SM).
A. Influence of One Diagnostics Mechanism –
Continuous Mode of Operation
If the method based on the MC is used for the hardware safety integrity evaluation,
then for the dual structure (Figure 3) with hardware identical units can be used the
CTMC, which is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The Markov model for the dual structure with the time-continuous failure de-
tection – continuous mode of operation and with one failure detection mechanism
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It is a simplified approach to the hardware safety integrity evaluation, which
can be used just when the SRCS has the failure detection mechanism. This failure
detection mechanism operates continuously in time and the SRCS operates in the
continuous mode.
The characteristic of the states in the model in Figure 4 is listed in Table 1.
State Characteristic
OK SRCS is functional; neither one unit has the failure.
2 Unit R or unit L has only the undetectable failures (one or more).
3 Unit R or unit L has the detectable failures (one or more); units can have also
the undetectable failures (one or more).
S The safe (dysfunctional) state – the state after detection and negation of the
failure. The EUC is in state, which is not dangerous.
D The dangerous state – both units have the failure.
Table 1. States of the model in Figure 4
The SRCS can go from the state OK to the dangerous state D on a trajectory,
which depends on the sequence of the failures occurrence and their detectability
(detectable or undetectable).
The characteristic of the transitions in the model in Figure 4 is listed in Table 2.
Transition Characteristic
OK → 2 Transition is realized, if the undetectable failure occurs in unit L or
unit R.
OK → 3 Transition is realized, if the detectable failure occurs in unit L or unit R.
2 → D Transition is realized due to the failure occurrence in the unit (L or R),
which is without failure.
2 → 3 Transition is realized due to the detectable failure occurrence in the unit,
which already has the undetectable failure.
3 → D Transition is realized due to the failure occurrence in the unit (L or R),
which is without failure.
3 → S Transition is realized due to the detection and negation of the failure
occurrence.
Table 2. Transitions in the model in Figure 4






where δ is the failure detection and negation rate, td is the failure detection time
(in this case td = tcd, where tcd is the duration time of one diagnostic cycle) and tN
is the time needed to the detected failure negation. Using the mean value of the
failure detection time is not accurate, but acceptable in practice [1, 2]. In case of
Modelling of the Diagnostics Influence on the Safety of the Control System 465
the pessimistic approach, the transition rate from the state 3 to the state S can be





CTMC in Figure 4 can be described by the transition rate matrix (16) and the
differential equations system (17):
Q =

−2λ 2λ · (1− c) 2λ · c 0 0
0 −λ · (1 + c) λ · c 0 λ
0 0 −λ− δ δ λ
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
 , (16)
p′OK(t) = −2λ · pOK(t),
p′2(t) = 2λ · (1− c) · pOK(t)− λ · (1 + c) · p2(t),
p′3(t) = 2λ · c · pOK(t) + λ · c · p2(t)− (λ+ δ) · p3(t), (17)
p′s(t) = δ · p3(t),
p′D(t) = λ · p2(t) + λ · p3(t).
If in the time t = 0 the SRCS is in the state OK (Figure 4), then the initial vector
−−−−−−→
P0(t = 0) = {1, 0, 0, 0, 0}, (18)
and the dangerous state probability [5]
pD(t) = e
−2λ.t − 1 + 2δ




(λ · c− δ) · (λ+ δ)
(e−(λ+δ)·t − 1). (19)
If c = 0, then
pD(t) = 1− 2e−λ·t + e−2λ·t. (20)
If c = 1, then
pD(t) =
e−2λ·tλ · (δ − δ · e2λ·t + λ+ λ · e2t·λ − 2λ · e−(δ−λ)·t)
(λ+ δ)(λ− δ)
. (21)
At the latest in time, when the probability value of the state D achieves the crit-
ical limit (the maximum allowed value related to the acceptable risk), it is necessary
to terminate the SRCS operation and execute the proof-test. The influence of the
proof-test on the hardware safety integrity of the SRCS is described in [9, 10, 11, 16].
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If the SRCS operates in the continuous mode and the failures diagnostics oper-
ates periodically and discreetly in time – always at the end of the diagnostic cycle
(Figure 1 a)), then the diagnostics influence on the hardware safety integrity of the
SRCS can be modelled using the multi-phase Markov model – combination of the
CTMC and the DTMC.
The failures influence on the hardware safety integrity of the SRCS in time,
when the failure diagnostics mechanism is not active, can be described by the model
in Figure 5. The failures occurrence is continuous in time, but the failure detection
is not possible and therefore the transition from the state 3 to the state S is not
possible. The state S in the model in Figure 5 is mentioned only by the reason of
representation of a compatibility with the model in Figure 4.
Figure 5. The reduced CTMC model for the dual structure with the time-continuous
failures detection – continuous mode of operation and with one failure detection mechanism
in time, when it is not active
The model in Figure 5 can be described by the differential equations system
p′OK(t) = −2λ · pOK(t),
p′2(t) = 2λ · (1− c) · pOK(t)− λ · (1 + c) · p2(t),
p′3(t) = 2λ · c · pOK(t) + λ · c · p2(t)− δ · p3(t), (22)
p′s(t) = 0,
p′D(t) = λ · p2(t) + λ · p3(t).
The failure detection mechanism influence (Figure 1 a)) on the hardware safety
integrity of the SRCS provided, that td → 0 (theoretical, but acceptable assump-




1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
 . (23)
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Using the matrix (23), is possible to calculate the initial distribution for solution
of the differential equations system (22) for the next diagnostic cycle
−−−−−−−−→
Pn+1(t = 0) =
−−−−−−−→
Pn(t = tcd) · P (24)
where n is the test cycle order (n = 1 after putting the SRCS into operation),
−−−−−−−→
Pn(t = tcd) is solution of the differential equations system (22) with the initial dis-
tribution (18) in the time t = 0 or the initial distribution calculated according to (24)


















The initial distribution for the next (n+ 1) cycle
−−−−−−−−→




OK(t = tcd), p
(n)
2 (t = tcd), 0, p
(n)
3 (t = tcd) + p
(n)
s (t = tcd),
p
(n)
D (t = tcd)
}
. (26)
Figure 6. The DTMC model for the dual structure with the time-discrete failures diag-
nostics – continuous mode of operation and with one failure detection mechanism
B. Influence of Two Diagnostics Mechanisms –
Continuous Mode of Operation
If the SRCS contains two failure detection mechanisms, then it is possible to consider
various combinations of operation of these failure detection mechanisms according
to the parameters and the operation mode. Generally, it is such a combination of
the failure detection mechanisms, that one mechanism is intended for the detection
of the maximum number of failures in the shortest possible time interval (the RM)
and the second mechanism (the SM) is intended for the detection of a certain group
of failures, which are not covered by the first mechanism.
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The analysis of the failure consequences on the hardware safety integrity can
be based on the same principles as in the case of one failure detection mechanism.
Although it is possible to proceed in a number of ways, the most suitable are the
following ones:
1. If the failure detection time is approximately the same for both the mechanisms,
thus it is possible to proceed in such a way, as if the SRCS contains only one
failure detection mechanism with the diagnostic coverage coefficient, which can
be calculated according to the (10) (if the Px is unknown, is necessary to choose
Px = 0) and the failure detection time, which can be determined according to
the (11).
2. It is possible to divide the set of failures on two subsets (X, Y ) and make the
analysis for each of them separately. The final probability of the dangerous state
pD(t) = pDX(t) + pDY (t)− pDX(t) · pDY (t), (27)
provided, that the dangerous state occurrence probability in consequence of
the failures from the first subset pDX(t)does not influence the dangerous state
occurrence probability in consequence of the failures from the second subset
pDY (t) and vice versa.
3. If the tSd  tRd, it is possible to proceed in such a way, that the RM operates
continuously in time and the SM operates discretely in time.
If it is valid, that tRd  tSd  tproof (tproof is the maximum time value between
two proof tests; in extreme cases that can be identified with the useful life of the
SRCS), not only the failures diagnostics of the RM, but even the failures diagnostics
of the SM can be considered as the continuous-time process. Then the SRCS reaction
to the failures occurrence can be described by the CTMC, which is shown in Figure 4.
The transition rate from the state 3 to the state S (Figure 4) can be determined
according to the (14) or (15). If the failure is detectable by the RM, then td = tRd.
If the failure is detectable by the SM, then td = tSd. Real value of the td ∈ 〈tRd, tSd〉.
In case of pessimistic approach, it can be assumed, that td = tSd. The diagnostic
coverage coefficient of the failures can be determined according to the (10). The
dangerous state probability can be calculated according to the (19) for the time
interval t ∈ 〈0, tproof〉 and if the proof-test is perfect, this curve will be repeated
periodically [9].
6 THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Let us suppose that the SF is implemented by the dual structure based on compos-
ite fail-safety with fail-safe comparison, as it is shown in Figure 3. The SRCS in
compliance with functional specification of the SF controls EUC. The unit R and
the unit L are hardware identical. Their failures rate λ = λL = λR = 2 × 10−5
h−1. The functional specification of the SF is irrelevant from the view of hardware
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safety integrity analysis of the SRCS. Let the supposed time interval, in which the
dangerous failure probability of the SF (pD(t)) will be calculated, be 1 year (it can
be, e.g., the time interval between the proof tests).
The SRCS operates in such a way that if the failure is detected, the safety
reaction is triggered and the SRCS transits to the state S (interruption of the SRCS
operation). The transition rate of the SRCS to the state S is determined according
to the (15).
A. One Failure Detection Mechanism
Let the SRCS have one failure detection mechanism with the diagnostic coverage
coefficient of the failures c = 0.99, which operates in such manner that the diagnostic
test is triggered every 0.5 h. The time duration of test and the time of reaction to
the failure is negligible with respect to the considered time interval 0.5 h.
If the SF is performed in continuous mode of operation and the diagnostic cycle
time (the failure detection time) is significantly less than the time between two proof
tests (tcd  tproof ), the dangerous failure probability of the SF can be calculated
according to the relation derived for the model in Figure 4. The time dependence
(pD(t)) is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. The dangerous failure probability of the SF; one failure detection mechanism;
continuous mode of operation – calculation using the CTMC model (Figure 4)
The dangerous failure probability of the SF can be calculated also using the re-
lations derived from models in Figure 5 and Figure 6 (CTMC/DTMC combination).
The time dependence pD(t) is shown in Figure 8 a). Modelling of the dangerous fail-
ure probability of the SF using the CTMC/DTMC combination is closer to reality,
but the calculation is significantly more time-consuming than in case of using only
the CTMC model.
Figure 8 b) shows only the shortened time frame of the dangerous failure prob-
ability of the SF calculated using the CTMC/DTMC, to achieve observability of
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the influence of the time-discreet diagnostic method on the monitored variable
−pD(t).
a) The whole time frame
b) The shortened time frame
Figure 8. The dangerous failure probability of the SF; one failure detection mechanism;
continuous mode of operation – calculation using the CTMC/DTMC model (Figures 5, 6)
The failures diagnostic coverage influence on the dangerous failure probability
of the SF can be seen in Figure 9. The results confirm the known fact, that fail-
ures diagnostic coverage under 60 % does not significantly influence the hardware
safety integrity of the SF. The failures diagnostic coverage influence is significant, if
c→ 1.
B. Two Failure Detection Mechanisms
Let us assume that the SRCS has two failure detection mechanisms. Let one fail-
ure detection mechanism (RM) operate in such manner that the diagnostic test is
triggered every 0.5 h and its diagnostic coverage coefficient of the failures c = 0.9.
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Figure 9. The failures diagnostic coverage influence on the dangerous failure probability
of the SF; one failure detection mechanism
Let the next failure detection mechanism (SM) operate in such manner that the
diagnostic test is triggered every 10 h. Let the SM cover 90 % of the failures, which
are not covered by the RM (cx = 0.09).
If the SF is performed in continuous mode of operation and the diagnostic cycle
time (the failure detection time) is significantly less than the time between two proof
tests (tcd  tproof ), the dangerous failure probability of the SF can be calculated
according to the relation derived for the model in Figure 4. The time dependence
pD(t) is shown in Figure 10. The comparison of the graphs in Figure 7 and in
Figure 10 shows that even if the diagnostic coverage coefficient is the same in both
cases, the SRCS with two failure detection mechanisms has worse safety proper-
ties. Deterioration of the safety properties is caused by the bigger failure detection
time.
Figure 10. The dangerous failure probability of the SF; two failure detection mechanisms;
continuous mode of operation – calculation using the CTMC model (Figure 4)
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7 CONCLUSIONS
In the paper, the basic idea how to solve problem related to the evaluation of differ-
ently operating failure detection mechanisms to the hardware safety integrity of the
SF is analyzed. Solution of this problem is based on the appropriate CTMC and
DTMC combination. All the factors were respected in the presented models that
significantly influence the hardware safety integrity of the SF.
In order to underline the significance of the problem, the obtained results are
presented as a simple dual structure with two elements. In practice, there are
often much more complex structures, when the SF is realized by bigger number of
elements, which are not only on the process level of control, but also on the higher
levels. This leads to the fact, that the SF is realized by parts of the SRCS with
different structures. In such cases the model creation is difficult – the number of
states in the model increases markedly, thus showing a tendency to increase the
probability of mistakes made by the analyst. A successful solution of this problem
lies in the decomposition of the SF hardware realization on modules with simple
structures and in appropriate using of combination of the different analysis methods
when integrating the partial results.
The dangerous failure probability of the SF can be calculated based on the
models presented in this paper. In practical use, on the basis of knowledge of the
dangerous failure probability, it is necessary to calculate the variable, which is re-
quired by relevant standards given to the application area. For example, [1] requires
to determinate the average probability of dangerous failure on demand of the SF
(PFDavg) in low demand mode of operation, or the average frequency of dangerous
failure of the SF (PFH) in high demand mode of operation or continuous mode of
operation.
The ideas mentioned in this paper have practical importance and they can be
properly used for the hardware safety integrity evaluation of the SF, which has
more complex hardware structure and several (at the same time operating) failure
detection mechanisms.
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[5] Ilavský, J.—Rástočný, K.—Ždánsky, J.: Common-Cause Failures as Major
Issue in Safety of Control Systems. Advances in Electrical and Electronic Engineering,
Vol. 11, 2013, No. 2, pp. 86–93. ISSN 1804-3119, doi: 10.15598/aeee.v11i2.748.
[6] Mechri, W.—Simin, C.—BenOthman, K.: Switching Markov Chains for a Holis-
tic Modeling of SIS Unavailability. Reliability Engineering and System Safety,
Vol. 133, 2015, pp. 212–222. ISSN 0951-8320, doi: 10.1016/j.ress.2014.09.005.
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versity of Žilina in 2003. He received his Ph.D. degree at the
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